THE
DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE PREDESTINATION STATEDANDASSERTED
CHAPTER IV.
Of
Reprobation or Predestination as it respects the ungodly.
From what has been said
in the preceding chapter concerning the election of some, it would unavoidably
follow, even supposing the Scriptures had been silent about it, that there must
be a rejection of others, as every choice does, most evidently and necessarily,
imply a refusal, for where there is no leaving out there can be no choice. But
beside the testimony of reason, the Divine Word is full and express to our
purpose; it frequently, and in terms too clear to be misunderstood, and too
strong to be evaded by any who are not proof against the most cogent evidence,
attests this tremendous truth, that some are "of old fore-ordained to
condemnation." I shall, in the discussion of this awful subject, follow
the method hitherto observed, and throw what I have to say into several
distinct positions supported by Scripture.
POSITION 1.--God did,
from all eternity, decree to leave some of Adam's fallen posterity in their
sins, and to exclude them from the participation for Christ and His benefits.
For the clearing of this, let it be observed that in all ages the much greater
part of mankind have been destitute even of the external means of grace, and
have not been favoured with the preaching of God's Word or any revelation of
his will. Thus, anciently, the Jews, who were in number the fewest of all
people, were, nevertheless, for a long series of ages, the only nation to whom
the Deity was pleased to make any special discovery of Himself, and it is
observable that our Lord himself principally confined the advantages of His
public ministry to that people; nay, He forbade His disciples to go among any
others (Matt. x. 5,6), and did not commission them to preach the Gospel
indiscriminately to Jews and Gentiles until after His resurrection (Mark xvi.
15; Luke xxiv. 47). Hence many nations and communities never had the advantage
of hearing the word preached, and consequently were strangers to the faith that
cometh thereby.
It is not indeed
improbable, but some individuals in these unenlightened countries might belong
to the secret election of grace, and the habit of faith might be wrought in
these. However, be that as it will, our argument is not affected by it. It is
evident that the nations of the world were generally ignorant, not only of God
Himself, but likewise of the way to please Him, the true manner of acceptance
with Him, and the means of arriving at the everlasting enjoyment of Him. Now,
if God had been pleased to have saved those people, would He not have
vouchsafed them the ordinary means of salvation? Would He not have given them
all things necessary in order to that end? But it is undeniable matter of fact
that He did not, and to very many nations of the earth does not at this day.
If, then, the Deity can consistently with His attributes deny to some the means
of grace, and shut them up in gross darkness and unbelief, why should it be
thought incompatible with His immensely glorious perfections to exclude some
persons from grace itself, and from that eternal life which is connected with
it, especially seeing He is equally the Lord and sovereign Disposer of the end
to which the means lead, as of the means which lead to that end? Both one and
the other are His, and He most justly may, as He most assuredly will, do what
He pleases with His own.
Besides, it being also
evident that many, even of them who live in places where the Gospel is preached,
as well as of those among whom it never was preached, die strangers to God and
holiness, and without experiencing anything of the gracious influences of His
Spirit, we may reasonably and sagely conclude that one cause of their so dying
is because it was not the Divine will to communicate His grace unto them,
since, had it been His will, He would actually have made them partakers
thereof, and had they been partakers of it they could not have died without it.
Now, if it was the will of God in time to refuse them this grace, it must have
been His will from eternity, since His will is, as Himself, the same yesterday,
to-day, and for ever.
The actions of God being
thus fruits of His eternal purpose, we may safely, and without any danger of
mistake, argue from them to that and infer that god therefore does such and
such things, because He decreed to do them, His own will being the sole cause
of all His works. So that, from His actually leaving some men in final
impenitency and unbelief, we assuredly gather that it was His everlasting
determination so to do, and consequently that He reprobated some from before
the foundation of the world. And as this inference is strictly rational, so is
it perfectly Scriptural. Thus the Judge will in the last day declare to those
on the left hand, "I never knew you" (Matt. vii. 23), i.e.,
" I never, no, not from eternity, loved, approved or acknowledged you for
Mine," or, in other words, "I always hated you."
Our Lord (in John xvii.)
divides the whole human race into two great classes--one He calls the world;
the other, "the men who were given Him out of the world." The latter,
it is said, the Father loved, even as He loved Christ Himself (ver. 23), but He
loved Christ "before the foundation of the world" (ver.24), i.e.,
from everlasting; therefore He loved the elect so too, and if He loved these
from eternity, it follows, by all the rules of antitheses, that He hated the
others as early. So, "The children being not yet born, neither having done
good or evil, that the purpose of God," etc. (Rom. ex.). From the example
of the two twins, Jacob and Esau, the apostle infers the eternal election of
some men and the eternal rejection of all the rest.
POSITION 2.--Some men
were, from all eternity, not only negatively excepted from a participation of
Christ and His salvation, but positively ordained to continue in their natural
blindness, hardness of heart, etc., and that by the judgment of God. (See Exod.
ix.; 1 Sam. ii. 25; 2 Sam. xvii. 14; Isa. vi. 9-11; 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12.) Nor
can these places of Scripture, with many others of like import, be understood
of an involuntary permission on the part of God, ad if God barely suffered it
to be so, quasi invitus, as it were by constraint, and against His will,
for He permits nothing which He did not resolve and determine to permit. His
permission is a positive, determinate act of His will, as Augustine, Luther and
Bucer justly observe. Therefore, if it be the will of God in time to permit
such and such men to continue in their natural state of ignorance and
corruption, the natural consequence of which is their falling into such and
such sins (observe God does not force them into sin, their actual disobedience
being only the consequence of their actual disobedience being only the
consequence of their not having that grace which God is not obliged to grant
them)--I say, if it be the will of God thus to leave them in time (and we must
deny demonstration itself, even known absolute matter of fact, if we deny that
some are so left), then it must have been the Divine intention from all
eternity so to leave them, since, as we have already had occasion to observe,
no new will can possibly arise in the mind of God. We see that evil men
actually are suffered to go on adding sin to sin, and if it be not inconsistent
with the sacred attributes actually to permit this, it should not possibly be
inconsistent with them to decree that permission before the foundations of the
world were laid.
Thus God efficaciously
permitted (having so decreed) the Jews to be, in effect, the crucifiers of
Christ, and Judas to betray Him (Acts iv. 27, 28; Matt. xxvi. 23,240. Hence we
find St. Augustine speaking thus: "Judas was chosen, but it was to do a
most execrable deed, that thereby the death of Christ, and the adorable work of
redemption by Him, might be accomplished. When therefore we hear our Lord say,
`Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?' we must understand
it thus, that the eleven were chosen in mercy, but Judas in judgment; they were
chosen to partake of Christ's kingdom; he was chosen and pitched upon to betray
Him and be the means of shedding His blood."
POSITION 3.--The
non-elect were predestinated, not only to continue in final impenitency, sin
and unbelief, but were likewise, for such their sins, righteously appointed to
infernal death hereafter.
This position is also
self-evident, for it is certain that in the day of universal judgment all the
human race will not be admitted into glory, but some of them transmitted to the
place of torment. Now, God does and will do nothing but in consequence of His
own decree (Psalm cxxxv. 6; Isa. xlvi. 11; Eph. i. 9, 11); therefore the
condemnation of the unrighteous was decreed of God, and if decreed by Him, decreed
from everlasting, for all His decrees are eternal. Besides, if God purposed to
leave those persons under the guilt and the power of sin, their condemnation
must of itself necessarily follow, since without justification and
sanctification (neither of which blessing are in the power of man) none can
enter heaven (John xiii. 8; Heb. xii. 14). Therefore, if God determined within
Himself thus to leave some in their sins (and it is but too evident that this
is really the case), He must also have determined within Himself to punish them
for those sins (final guilt and final punishment being correlatives which
necessarily infer each other), but God did determine both to leave and to
punish the non-elect, therefore there was a reprobation of some from eternity. Thus,
"Go, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his
angels" (Matt. xxv.); for Satan and all his messengers, emissaries and
imitators, whether apostate spirits or apostate men.
Now, if penal fire was,
in decree from everlasting, prepared for them, they, by all the laws of
argument in the world, must have been in the counsel of God prepared, i.e.,
designed for that fire, which is the point I undertook to prove. Hence we read
"of vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, put together, made up, formed
or fashioned, for perdition" (Rom. ix.), who are and can be no other than
the reprobate. To multiply Scriptures on this head would be almost endless; for
a sample, consult Prov. xvi.4; 1 Peter ii. 8; 2 Peter ii. 12; Jude 4; Rev.
xiii.8.
POSITION 4.--As the
future faith and good works of the elect were not the cause of their being
chosen, so neither were the future sins of the reprobate the cause of their
being passed by, but both the choice of the former and the decretive omission
of the latter were owing, merely and entirely, to the sovereign will and
determinating pleasure of God.
We distinguish between
preterition, or bare nonelection, which is a purely negative thing, and
condemnation, or appointment to punishment: the will of God was the cause of
the former, the sins of the non-elect are the reason of the latter. Though God
determined to leave, and actually does leave, whom He pleases in the spiritual
darkness and death of nature, out of which He is under no obligation to deliver
them, yet He does not positively condemn any of these merely because He hath
not chosen them, but because they have sinned against Him. (See Rom. i. 21-24;
Rom. ii. 8, 9; 2 Thess. ii. 12.) Their preterition or non-inscription in the
book of life is no unjust on the part of God, because out of a world of rebels,
equally involved in guilt, God (who might, without any impeachment of His
justice, have passed by all, as He did the reprobate angels) was, most
unquestionably, at liberty, if it so pleased Him, to extend the scepter of His
clemency to some and to pitch upon whom He would as the objects of it. Nor was
this exemption of some any injury to the non-elect, whose case would have been
just as bad as it is, even supposing the others had not been chosen at all. Again,
the condemnation of the ungodly (for it is under that character alone that they
are the subjects of punishment and were ordained to it) is not unjust, seeing
it is for sin and only for sin. None are or will be punished but for their
iniquities, and all iniquity is properly meritorious of punishment: where,
then, is the supposed unmercifulness, tyranny or injustice of the Divine
procedure?
POSITION 5.--God is the
creator of the wicked, but not of their wickedness; He is the author of their
being, but not the infuser of their sin.
It is most certainly His
will (for adorable and unsearchable reasons) to permit sin, but, with all
possible reverence be it spoken, it should seem that He cannot, consistently
with the purity of His nature, the glory of His attributes, and the truth of
His declarations, be Himself the author of it. "Sin," says the
apostle, "entered into the world by one man," meaning by Adam,
consequently it was not introduced by the deity Himself. Though without the
permission of His will and the concurrence of His providence, its introduction
had been impossible, yet is He not hereby the Author of sin so introduced.
Luther observes (De Serv. Arb., c. 42): "It is a great degree of
faith to believe that God is merciful and gracious, though He saves so few and
condemns so many, and that He is strictly just, though, in consequence of His
own will, He made us no exempt from liableness to condemnation." And cap.
148: "Although God doth not make sin, nevertheless He ceases not to create
and multiply individuals in the human nature, which, through the withholding of
His Spirit, is corrupted by sin, just as a skilful artist may form curious
statues out of bad materials. So, such as their nature is, such are men
themselves; God forms them out of such a nature."
POSITION 6.--The
condemnation of the reprobate is necessary and inevitable. Which we prove thus.
It is evident from Scripture that the reprobate shall be condemned. But nothing
comes to pass (much less can the condemnation of a rational creature) but in
consequence of the will and decree of God. Therefore the non-elect could not be
condemned was it not he Divine pleasure and determination that they should, and
if God wills and determines their condemnation, that condemnation is necessary
and inevitable. by their sins they have made themselves guilty of death, and as
it is not the will of God to pardon those sins and grant them repentance unto
life, the punishment of such impenitent sinners ia as unavoidable as it is
just. It is our Lord' own declaration that "a corrupt tree cannot bring
forth good fruit" (Matt. vii.), or, in other words, that a depraved sinner
cannot produce in himself those gracious habits, nor exert those gracious acts,
without which no adult person can be saved. consequently the reprobate must, as
corrupt, fruitless trees (or fruitful in evil only), be "hewn down and
cast into the fire " (Matt. iii.). This, therefore, serves as another
argument in proof of the inevitability of their future punishment, which
argument, in brief, amounts to this: they who are not saved from sin must
unavoidably perish, but the reprobate are not saved from sin (for they have
neither will nor power to save themselves, and God, though He certainly can,
yet He certainly will not save them), therefore their perdition is unavoidable.
Nor does it follow, from hence, that God forces the reprobate into sin, and
thereby into misery, against their wills, but that, in consequence of their
natural depravity (which it is not the Divine pleasure to deliver them out of,
neither is He bound to do it, nor are they themselves so much as desirous that
He would), they are voluntarily biassed and inclined to evil; nay, which is
worse still, they hug and value their spiritual chains, and even greedily
pursue the paths of sin, which lead to the chambers of death. Thus God does not
(as we are slanderously reported to affirm) compel the wicked to sin, as the
rider spurs forward an unwilling horse; God only says in effect that tremendous
word, "Let them alone" (Matt. xv. 14). He need but slacken the reins
of providential restraint and withhold the influence of saving grace, and
apostate man will too soon, and too surely, of his own accord, "fall by
his iniquity"; he will presently be, spiritually speaking, a felo de
se, and, without any other efficiency, lay violent hands on his own soul.
So that though the condemnation of the reprobate is unavoidable, yet the
necessity of it is so far from making them mere machines or involuntary agents
, that it does not in the least interfere with the rational freedom of their
wills, nor serve to render them less inexcusable.
POSITION 7.--The
punishment of the non-elect was not the ultimate end of their creation, but the
glory of God. It is frequently objected to us that, according to our view of
predestination, "God makes some persons on purpose to damn them," but
this we never advanced; nay, we utterly reject it as equally unworthy of God to
do and of a rational being to suppose. The grand, principal end, proposed by
the Deity to Himself in His formation of all things, and of mankind in
particular, was the manifestation and display of His own glorious attributes.
His ultimate scope in the creation of the elect is to evidence and make known
by their salvation the unsearchable riches of His power and wisdom, mercy and
love, and the creation of the non-elect is for the display of His justice,
power, sovereignty, holiness and truth. So that nothing can be more certain
than the declaration of the text we have frequently had occasion to cite,
"The Lord hath made all things for Himself, even the wicked for the day of
evil" (Prov. xvi.). On one hand, the "vessels of wrath are fitted for
destruction," in order that God may "show His wrath and make His
power longsuffering (Rom. ix. 32). On the other hand, He afore prepared the
elect to salvation, that on them He might demonstrate "the riches of His
glory and mercy" (ver. 23). As. therefore, God Himself is the sole Author
and efficient of all His own actions, so is He likewise the supreme end to which
they lead and in which they terminate.
Besides, the creation
and perdition of the ungodly answer another purpose (though a subordinate one)
with regard to the elect themselves, who from the rejection of those learn(1)
to admire the riches of the Divine love toward themselves, which planned and
has accomplished the work of their salvation, while others, by nature on an
equal level with them, are excluded from a participation of the same benefits.
And such a view of the Lord's distinguishing mercy is (2) a most powerful
motive to thankfulness that when they too might justly have been condemned with
the world of the non-elect, they were marked out as heirs of the grace of life.
(3) Hereby they are taught ardently to love the heavenly Father; (4) to trust
in Him assuredly for a continued supply of grace while they are on earth, and
for the accomplishment of His eternal decree and promise by their glorification
in heaven; and (5) to live as becomes those who have received such unspeakable
mercies from the hand of their God and Saviour. So Bucer somewhere observes
that the punishment of the reprobate "is useful to the elect, inasmuch a
it influences them to a greater fear and abhorrence of sin, and to a firmer
reliance on the goodness of God."
POSITION
8.--Notwithstanding God did from all eternity irreversibly choose out and fix
upon some to be partakers of salvation by Christ and rejected the rest (who are
therefore termed by the apostle, the refuse, or those that remained and were
left out), acting in both according to the good pleasure of His own sovereign
will, yet He did not herein act an unjust, tyrannical or cruel part, nor yet
show Himself a respecter of persons.
(1) He is not unjust in
reprobating some, neither can He be so, for "the Lord is holy in all His ways
and righteous in all His works" (Psa. cxlv.). But salvation and damnation
are works of His, consequently neither of them is unrighteous or unholy. It is
undoubted matter of fact that the Father draws some men to Christ and saves
them in Him with an everlasting salvation, and that He neither draws nor saves
some others; and if it be not unjust in God actually to forbear saving these
persons after they are born, it could not be unjust in Him to determine as much
before they were born. What is not unjust for God to do in time, would not, by
parity of argument, be unjust in Him to resolve upon and decree from eternity.
And, surely, if the apostle's illustration be allowed to have any propriety, or
to carry any authority, it can no more be unjust in God to set apart some for
communion with Himself in this life and the next, and to set aside others
according to His own free pleasure, than for a potter to make out of the same
mass of clay some vessels for honourable and others for inferior uses. The
Deity, being absolute Lord of all His creatures, is accountable to none for His
doings, and cannot be chargeable with injustice for disposing of His own as He
will.
(2) Nor is the decree of
reprobation a tyrannical one, It is, indeed, strictly sovereign; but lawful sovereignty
and lawless tyranny are as really distinct and different as any two opposites
can be. He is a tyrant, in the common acceptation of that word, who (a) either
usurps the sovereign authority and arrogates to himself a dominion to which he
has no right, or (b) who, being originally a lawful prince, abuses his power
and governs contrary to law. But who dares to lay either of these accusations
to the Divine charge? God as Creator has a most unquestionable and unlimited
right over the souls and bodies of men, unless it can be supposed, contrary to
all Scripture and common sense, that in making of man He made a set of beings
superior to Himself and exempt from His jurisdiction. Taking it for granted,
therefore, that God has an absolute right of sovereignty over His creatures, if
He should be pleased (as the Scriptures repeatedly assure us that He is) to
manifest and display that right by graciously saving some and justly punishing
others for their sins, who are we that we should reply against God?
Neither does the
ever-blessed Deity fall under the second notion of a tyrant, namely, as one who
abuses his power by acting contrary to law, for by what exterior law is He
bound, who is the supreme Law-giver of the universe? The laws promulgated by
Him are designed for the rule of our conduct, not of His. Should it be objected
that "His own attributes of goodness and justice, holiness and truth, are
a law to Himself," I answer that, admitting this to be the case, there is
nothing in the decree of reprobation as represented in Scripture, and by us
from thence, which clashes with any of those perfections. With regard to the
Divine goodness, though the non-elect are not objects of it in the sense the
elect are, yet even they are not wholly excluded from a participation of it.
They enjoy the good things of providence in common with God's children, and
very often in a much higher degree. Besides, goodness, considered as it is in
attribute, supposing no rational beings had been created at all or saved when
created. To which may be added, that the goodness of the Deity does not cease
to be infinite in itself, only because it is more extended to some objects than
it is to others. The infinity of this perfection, as residing in God and
coinciding with His essence, is sufficiently secured, without supposing it to
reach indiscriminately to all the creatures He has made. For, was this way of
reasoning to be admitted, it would lead us too far and prove too much, since,
if the infinity of His goodness is to be estimated by the number of objects
upon which it terminates, there must be an absolute, proper infinity of
reasonable beings to terminate that goodness upon; consequently it would follow
from such premises either that the creation is as truly infinite as the
Creator, or, if otherwise, that the Creator's goodness could not be infinite,
because it has not an infinity of objects to make happy.
Lastly, if it was not
incompatible with God's infinite goodness to pass by the whole body of fallen
angels and leave them under the guilt of their apostasy, much less can it clash
with that attribute to pass by some of fallen mankind and resolve to leave them
in their sins and punish them for them. Nor is it inconsistent with Divine
justice to withhold saving grace from some, seeing the grace of God is not what
He owes to any. It is a free gift to those that have it, and is not due to
those that are without it; consequently there can be no injustice in not giving
what God is not bound to bestow. there is no end of cavilling at the Divine dispensations
if men are disposed to do it. We might, with equality of reason, when our hand
is in, presume to charge the Deity with partiality for not making all His
creatures angels because it was in His power to do so, as charge Him with
injustice for not electing all mankind. Besides, how can it possibly be
subversive of His justice to condemn, and resolve to condemn, the non-elect for
their sins when those very sins were not atoned for by Christ as the sins of
the elect were? His justice in this case is so far from hindering the
condemnation of the reprobate that it renders it necessary and indispensable.
Again, is the decree of sovereign preterition and of just condemnation for sin
repugnant to the Divine holiness? Not in the least, so far from it, that it
does not appear how the Deity could be holy if He did not hate sin and punish
it. Neither is it contrary to His truth and veracity. Quite the reverse. For
would not the Divine veracity fall to the ground if the finally wicked were not
condemned?
(3) God, in the
reprobation of some, does not act a cruel part. Whoever accused a chief
magistrate of cruelty for not sparing a company of atrocious malefactors, and
for letting the sentence of the law take place upon them by their execution?
If, indeed, the magistrate pleases to pity some of them and remit their
penalty, we applaud his clemency, but the punishment of the rest is no
impeachment of his mercy. Now, with regard to God, His mercy is free and
voluntary. He may extend it to and withhold it from whom He pleases
(Rom. ix. 15, 18), and it is sad indeed if we will not allow the
Sovereign, the all-wise Governor of heaven and earth, the same privilege and
liberty we allow to a supreme magistrate below.
(4) Nor is God, in
choosing some and rejecting others, a respecter of persons. He only comes under
that title who, on account of parentage, country, dignity, wealth, or for any
other external consideration, shows more favour to one person than to another.
But that is not the case with God. He considers all men as sinners by nature,
and has compassion not on persons of this or that sect, country, sex, age or
station in life, because they are so circumstanced, but on whom, and because,
He will have compassion. Pertinent to the present purpose is that passage of
St. Augustine: "Forasmuch as some people imagine that they must look on
God as a respecter of persons if they believe that without any respect had to
the previous merits of men, He hath mercy on whom He will, and calls whom it is
His pleasure to call, and makes good whom He pleases. The scrupulousness of
such people arises from their not duly attending to this one thing, namely,
that damnation is rendered to the wicked as a matter of debt, justice and
desert, whereas the grace given to those who are delivered is free and
unmerited, so that the condemned sinner cannot allege that he is unworthy of
his punishment, nor the saint vaunt or boast as if he was worthy of his reward.
Thus, in the whole course of this procedure, there is no respect of persons. they
who are condemned and they who are set at liberty constituted originally one
and the same lump, equally infected with sin and liable to vengeance. Hence the
justified may learn from the condemnation of the rest that that would have been
their own punishment had not God's free grace stepped in to their rescue."
Before I conclude this
head, I will obviate a fallacious objection very common in the mouths of our
opponents. "How," they say, "is the doctrine of reprobation
reconcilable with the doctrine of a future judgment?" To which I answer
that there need be no pains to reconcile these two, since they are so far from
interfering with each other that one follows from the other, and the former
renders the latter absolutely necessary. Before the judgment of the great day,
Christ does not so much act as the judge of His creatures as their absolute
Lord and Sovereign. From the first creation to the final consummation of all
things He does, in consequence of His own eternal and immutable purpose (as a
Divine Person), graciously work in and on His own elect, and permissively
harden the reprobate. But when all the transactions of providence and grace are
wound up in the last day, He will then properly sit as Judge, and openly
publish and solemnly ratify, if I may so say, His everlasting decrees by
receiving the elect, body and soul, into glory, and by passing sentence on the
non-elect (not for their having done what they could not help, but) for their
wilful ignorance of Divine things and their absolute unbelief, for their
omissions of moral duty and for their repeated iniquities and transgressions.
POSITION
9.--Notwithstanding God's predestination is most certain and unalterable, so
that no elect person can perish nor any reprobate be saved, yet it does not
follow from thence that all precepts, reproofs and exhortations on the part of
god, or prayers on the part of man, are useless, vain and insignificant.
(1) These are not
useless with regard to the elect, for they are necessary means of bringing them
to the knowledge of the truth at first, afterwards of stirring up their pure
minds by way of remembrance, and of edifying and establishing them in faith,
love and holiness. Hence that of St. Augustine: "The commandment will tell
thee, O man, what thou oughtest to have, reproof will show thee wherein thou
art wanting, and praying will teach thee from whom thou must receive the
supplies which thou wantest."
(2) Nor are these vain
with regard to the reprobate, for precept, reproof and exhortation may, if duly
attended to, be a means of making them careful to adjust their moral, external
conduct according to the rules of decency, justice and regularity, and thereby
prevent much inconvenience to themselves and injury to society. And as for
prayer, it is the duty of all without exception. Every created being (whether
elect or reprobate matters not as to this point) is, as such, dependent on the
Creator for all things, and, if dependent, ought to have recourse to Him, both
in a way of supplication and thanksgiving.
(3)
But to come closer still. That absolute predestination does not set aside, nor
render superfluous the use of preaching, exhortation, etc., we prove from the
examples of Christ Himself and His apostles, who all taught and insisted upon
the article of predestination, and yet took every opportunity of preaching to
sinners and enforced their ministry with proper rebukes, invitations and
exhortations as occasion required. Though they showed unanswerably that
salvation is the free gift of God and lies entirely at His sovereign disposal,
that men can of themselves do nothing spiritually good, and that it is God who
of His own pleasure works in them both to will and to do, yet they did not
neglect to address their auditors as beings possessed of reason and conscience,
nor omitted to remind them of their duties as such; but showed them their sin
and danger by nature, and laid before them the appointed way and method of
salvation as exhibited in the Gospel.
Our Saviour Himself
expressly, and in terminis, assures us that no man can come to Him
except the Father draw him, and yet He says, "Come unto Me, all ye that
labour," etc. St. Peter told the Jews that they had fulfilled " the
determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God" in putting the Messiah to
death (Acts ii.), and yet sharply rebukes them for it. St. Paul declares,
"It is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth," and yet
exhorts the Corinthians so to run as to obtain the prize. He assures us that
"we know not what to pray for as we ought" (Rom. viii.), and yet
directs us to "pray without ceasing" (1 Thess. v.). He avers that the
foundation or decree of the Lord standeth sure, and yet cautions him who
"thinks he stands, to take heed lest he fall" (2 Tim. ii.). St.
James, in like manner, says that " every good and perfect gift cometh down
from above," and yet exhorts those who want wisdom to ask it of God. So,
then, all these being means whereby the elect are frequently enlightened into
the knowledge of Christ, and by which they are, after they have believed through
grace, built up in Him, and are means of their perseverance in grace to the
end; these are so far from being vain and insignificant that they are highly
useful and necessary, and answer many valuable and important ends, without in
the least shaking the doctrine of predestination in particular or the analogy
of faith in general. Thus St. Augustine: "We must preach, we must reprove,
we must pray, because they to whom grace is given will hear and act
accordingly, though they to whom grace is not given will do neither."